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Alija Izetbegovic

President of Bosnia Herzegovina

  While some proclaim him to be the greatest ever son of the Bosnjak people, others have been calling him grandpa for a long time. At the moment Alija Izetbegovic is no doubt the Bosnjak number one, the favourite president, and the leader of the people. His political adversaries would immediately add though - leader of the Bosnjak people only. However, the truth is that Izetbegovic managed, through his wise policy, calmness and composure, to persuade the world to admit that there is a difference between a victim and an aggressor, as well as to preserve, through his decisive remarks against revenge of any kind, the multi-ethnic feature of Bosnia.

Alija Izetbegovic is 72; his health is poor, his life has been difficult, and his function is even more so. He was born in Bosanski Samac; he graduated law; and is a politician by conviction. He was put on trial for the first time in 1946, as a young Muslim, and sentenced to a three-year prison term. In a well-known Sarajevan trial, in 1983, he was again sentenced to prison. This time the reason was the Islamic Declaration (Islamska Deklaracija), the book he wrote in 1970, and because of which he was sentenced to 14 years in prison. However he spent five years and eight months their. As a result of the Islamic Declaration, Izetbegovic acquired, besides a prison-sentence, accusations of fundamentalism. Even today, his political opponents quote the argument, that is more than controversial for them: "In the Muslim world, Islam was - and still is - the only idea in whose name and through which one can arouse the masses, and carry out any real change." However, even his greatest enemies did not manage to accuse him of instigating hatred.

Izetbegovic began his political career as the leader of a national party. SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije - Party of Democratic Action) was officially founded on the 26th of May, 1990, as the Bosnjak-Muslims' first national party, and from the very start this party was looking for its followers among believers. The supporters of SDA and HDZ tied their flags during pre-election rallies, before the first democratic elections. Immediately after the announcement of the results, according to which the national parties won a convincing victory in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the tripartite coalition: SDS - HDZ - SDA entered the scene. Alija Izetbegovic became the president of the Presidency of RBiH on the 25th of November, 1990. That happened after Fikret Abdic surrendered the leading role to him, as the leader of the Party of Democratic Action, on whose voting list Abdic won the greatest number of votes. However, Izetbegovic immediately justified it. From the very beginning of his career, as the president of the Presidency, he was classified among moderate politicians.

While Karadzic threatened from the parliament stand that "one nation will disappear," Izetbegovic was precise - that was in October 1991: "Muslim people will not disappear." Immediately after that he declared solemnly: "Muslim people will not rise against anyone." As the president of the Presidency he replied to Karadzic's threats: "However, I wish to declare to citizens of B&H; there will be no war." These words Izetbegovic repeated several times, for the last time on the 17th of March, 1992, when in an interview given to the magazine "Danas" he said "There will be no war in Bosnia, either local or imported." On the same occasion he expressed his attitude toward the former JNA (Yugoslav People's Army):

"The Army is not what it was a few months ago. It is neither better, nor worse, it has changed regarding its quantity, quality, psychology, and even regarding its intentions and goals. The army will not occupy Bosnia, it will not execute a coup d' etat."

When a Serb witness at a wedding was killed on Bascarsija, Izetbegovic did not restrain himself and said: "This is a shot at BiH." Still deeply convinced the worst would not happen, he presented this to the citizens of Sarajevo in the following way: "There are forces that wish to provoke chaos and panic - do not be fooled - the situation is under control, and you can walk peacefully through the town." Izetbegovic simply believed that: "It takes two to fight a war." He persevered in the strategy of negotiating with everyone. Together with Kiro Gligorov, the president of Macedonia, during the negotiations on how to solve the Yugo-crisis, he came up with a final attempt to solve the problems of the former Yugoslavia. They were suggesting a loose confederation. Although, at the time of the aggression against Croatia, he declared: "That is not our war," in February 1992, when people from west Herzegovina blocked the road against Chetnik tanks in Listica, he asked assembled masses:

"Whom shall you believe in, if not in me and Tudjman?"

"The recognition of B&H could hinder the plans that are being made regarding Bosnia. Therefore, we look forward to the 6th of April," said Izetbegovic on the 31st of March, after negotiations that were held in Brussels, to which three coalition partners in the B&H government travelled in separate planes. JNA tanks had already taken the water reservoir on Mojmilo in Sarajevo. According to some accounts, the aggression against BiH had already started with the attack on the village Ravno. Soon the tragedy of Bijeljina followed; and on the 5th of April, Sarajevo was attacked. On the 6th of April, B&H became an internationally recognised state. Only on the 26th of April, the agreement, according to which the Army units were to leave Bosnia, was signed in Skopje. In the meantime Izetbegovic himself was inviting Army units to act as a tampon in areas of attack conducted by "para-military formations of SDS."

On the 2nd of May, 1992, Izetbegovic became prisoner of that very JNA(Yugoslav People's Army). He was exchanged one day later. Milan Kukanjac left Sarajevo, and Alija Izetbegovic returned to the Presidency. Much later the president would publicly say that Fikret Avdic was preparing a coup d' etat on that day. However, Abdic's intentions were thwarted; and on the 4th of May, the artillery encirclement around the town was finally complete. The JNA remained in their barracks, and left in May and the first half of June. The Presidency formed a committee that respected Izetbegovic's agreement in Skopje. For its part, the JNA responded with artillery salvos. When the number of victims of the aggression against B&H was to a great extent measured with four digit numbers, the Presidency of the state declared a state of war. That was on the 20th of June 1992.

"To what extent Bosnia is defined through the referendum is another question. It is defined as a sovereign and independent state. I do not know if there was any discussion about it being whole, or undivided," complained Izetbegovic at a meeting of the Presidency on the 3rd of June1992. However, that was not the first dilemma about the division of B&H. In the beginning of May '92, Izetbegovic declared: "I do not like maps. However, confronted with the threat of war, I would agree even to the map." Actually, "the game with maps" had already begun on the 21st and 22nd of February, 1992, in Lisbon, and it continued through all further discussions and negotiations about B&H. It continued even when SDS (Srpska Demokratska Stranka - Serb Democratic Party) was proclaimed a terrorist organisation, and when the ban of this party followed. In the meantime, on the eve of the departure for a new negotiating session in Lisbon, on the 21st of March, of the war year 1992, the plans for a confederation between B&H and Croatia were disclosed. Izetbegovic then said: "I supported that idea before, and it is now actualised through the acquirement of independence." Europe replied: "In Bosnia and Herzegovina any agreement between two parties, at the expense of the third party, is unacceptable."

However, Izetbegovic never failed to stress: "I wish to make it known; we have never interceded for the principle of ethnic division." He repeated that in Geneva in January '93, when he was already in a situation to bargain over the percentage of the territory, and over the future position of the Bo_njak state; that is, of its extending to the sea and the river Sava. That was the time of the Vance-Owen plan. Izetbegovic commented on that plan: "The plan is bad, but it is the best one to end the war in B&H." Three months later, on the 26th of April, 1993, the plan failed, after having been publicly refused by the Serb parliament in Bijeljina. Izetbegovic was then, as in countless similar situations, virtually forced to make concessions. He was practically blackmailed during long negotiations and talks which he always attended only after international factors secured promises by Karadzic not to shoot down the plane with the president.

When the Owen-Stoltenberg plan appeared, there were already public talks about the president's great wish to preserve the people. On the 31st of July, 1993, after the first round of Geneva peace talks, Izetbegovic sent the word via radio: "We are trying to preserve a great part of Bosnia for our people." In his opening speech about this; held in front of the Assembly of RB&H, Izetbegovic says:

"Our position is branded with two zealous, nationalistic movements in our immediate neighbourhood and a strange, incomprehensible indifference, or inertia, of the rest of the world. In that context, constantly confronted with the alternative of the continuation of war, we cannot defend the concept of a united B&H any longer. We have decided to defend its entirety for future, we hoped more sensible generations. In the meantime, it seems we must divide. We can do that at the negotiating table, or on the battle field, in the war in which alas, gradually all laws cease to apply. I think it is better to do that at the negotiating table. However, for history, it should be remembered - we did not wish the division, it was imposed on us."

It was at the same time the most difficult year of the war. The B&H Army fought on two fronts. The conflicts with HVO (Hrvatsko Vijece Odbrane - Croat Council of Defence) entered the most tragic phase. However, Izetbegovic and Tudjman tried to talk. There were no meetings and no talks with Milosevic. The United States of America, having already officially supported the independence of B&H on the 8th of April, 1992, joined the effort to end the conflict at least on the western front. On the 18th of March, 1994, the Federation of B&H was established in Washington. This was preceded with a Military Agreement, signed in Split on the 12th of March. That agreement defined conditions and a way of ending the conflict between B&H Army and HVO.

Speaking of the army, Izetbegovic was being criticised; for having over-sized aspirations in defining army strategy, for vital military decisions, for mistrust within the qualified cadre, and for relying too much on some of his friends from prison. Hasan Cengic was the main supplier of the B&H Army from abroad. He left the function of deputy defence minister after an ultimatum by the USA. In Sarajevo itself, army commanders, with whom the B&H state later dealt with as masters of organised crime, were concerned with the president's authority. At the beginning of 1995, five members of the B&H presidency accused the army of becoming ideologically oriented, but Izetbegovic rejected their statement. The General staff of the B&H Army made a public declaration in support of the president and dr. Ejup Ganic, confronting thus the rest of its chief command. At the great parade in Zenica; on the occasion of the anniversary of the Third corps; Alija Izetbegovic greeted the soldiers with salaam; thus contradicting his own statement given on mount Zuc: "Were only one Croat or Serb killed defending Sarajevo, we should pay them respect."

On the 14th of April, 1996 in Zenica, Izetbegovic also said: "Were it not for SDA, B&H would be a province of Greater Serbia today, or it would be destroyed." Izetbegovic's habit of identifying SDA with the people, army, politics and everything else in B&H, was the reason why he was often asked whether he was appearing as the president of the Party or the chair of the highest state authority. That was particularly apparent in the presidentŐs speeches on the B&H Army.

At one moment, it seemed that there was a deep understanding between the president and the Army, and also the perception of the former; the army of the defenders of Bosnia and Herzegovina could not make a significant turn. Thus it happened that the president became one of the rare Sarajevans who expressed belief in one of many signed truces: "They retreated, and that is our victory. You can let your children skate freely, they can go to school. That is their explicit defeat" - he declared in February 1994. From then until Dayton, several truces were signed, and in the meantime the even bloodier Markale incident occurred in Sarajevo. The president changed his opinion. "Next winter we cannot face this conditions," he said at the end of April 1995, announcing the great battle to break the blockade of Sarajevo. He even gave the precise timing when it would happen: between the Day of Youth and the Day of Statehood.

If the military analysts did not agree on the probability of such large action, they were unique in its assessment. Later, this action was characterised as the greatest defeat of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After that, as a counter attack, the offensive on the demilitarised zone of Srebrenica followed. Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both in their book "Srebrenica - note on the war crime," write: "In that period (July 1993) Haris Silajdzic, Bosnian prime minister, who looked like one of the rare true democrats and combatants for a multi-ethnic B&H, indicated that, should Serbs be willing to give up Sarajevo for enclaves, he would be prepared to go to Srebrenica himself in order to persuade people to move from there." Izetbegovic himself expressed his attitude towards this to those, whom he personally considered the most responsible: "Gentlemen generals, you deceived me." It was at Proskok in July 1995, after the failed attempt to break the blockade, and after the horrors of Srebrenica. However, officially, nobody was ever called to account. The president promised the women from Srebrenica that they would remain his concern. At the anniversary of the fall of Srebrenica he stressed: "When something so terrible as Srebrenica happens, then there are no innocent ones."

In his career as a politician, Alija Izetbegovic has had a whole series of events and statements, that have been interpreted in different ways. However, these events and statements had an impact, both on his political image, and on the country, whose head he is. "In the morning I think one should accept one solution, and in the afternoon I think one should not," admitted the president in front of TV cameras, explaining his concern for the people. From the very beginning, the people were one of Izetbegovic's strongest arguments. The president referred to the people every time when, jammed between different political options, he agreed to talks about territorial partition, according to ethnic principles. Izetbegovic likes to say about himself; he is a man from the people. The people return this so that even for the greatest mistake they always blame those around Izetbegovic, consoling themselves by saying the president does not know what is going on. The myth about Izetbegovic being horrified with the life of luxury, and the personality cult, which is being attributed to him more and more, is being added to it.

On the one hand, it is true; the president is still being driven in an Audi 100 which is more than 10 years old; and on the other hand, it is also true that there is no strike that cannot be stopped, no pensions or disability pensions that cannot be paid, simply if the president says so. His authority today is unlimited, and unquestionable among Bosnjaks, and its magnitude stopped being measured long ago. Alija Izetbegovic has absolute control in party, military, police, religious, diplomatic and any other matters. In an open letter, sent to the editors of Radio and Television B&H on the 2nd of January, 1996, Izetbegovic settled accounts with Santa Claus. "I also ask you not to impose on us a certain Santa Claus, and other symbols unfamiliar to our people. Let everybody keep those symbols to themselves, in their home, if they wish to do so. Television is a public institution, and our people are not stupid enough to be deceived any longer."

Even the most ardent followers, and the greatest opponents admit to Izetbegovic's exceptional skill in eliminating eventual political rivals. Thus, all greater individualists were bid farewell from SDA: Adil Zulfikarpasic, Muhamed Filipovic, Fikret Abdic, Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, Haris Silajdzic. Today, opponents criticise him for relying too much on the circle of his friends from prison; for his constantly bad selection of cadres, and for his expressed hesitance. The radicals blame him for making true, classic bey's estate out of Bosnia, illustrating that with Izetbegovic's trust, that is above all aimed towards the members of his family: his daughters Lejla and Sabina, and his son Bakir. Nijaz Durakovic said on several occasions that Izetbegovic himself told him that he was contemplating the idea that his son Bakir succeed him. Although to the West something like that is unthinkable, Izetbegovic still has the continuous support of America, which admits even today, that he is most co-operative. When the USA, in an ultimate way, requested twice that close Izetbegovic associates be replaced, both persons were dismissed from the function without much dilemma. As for the East, with his assertion "We are in a way both East and West - because we are Muslims; we understand the dilemmas of the Islamic world; and because we are European people - we understand the dilemmas of the West," Izetbegovic secured the support of Islamic countries a long time ago. Their support is very strong even today.

Izetbegovic also received accolades with his speech held at the inaugural meeting of the House of representatives, in the B&H Parliament, on the 5th of October, 1996. He began with the remark that he had prepared his speech early that morning, that was at the time when he thought that Serb representatives would attend the meeting. He read that speech anyway:

"... I wish to direct a few words towards the Serb representatives, both to the members of parliament and to guests. Coming to Sarajevo you have broken the Devil's leg. Therefore, welcome to Sarajevo. You should feel secure here. This is also your city, for Sarajevo is the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I hope I can guess the feelings of many among you, if I express a firm belief; the days of misfortune, and the days of evil are finally behind us."


This brilliant start justified all expectation of the world: Dayton Bosnia could take a step into a brighter future. The president gave the green light for that in the most dignified way:

"This is our duty to our children, and the children are not responsible for the sins of their fathers. There are no bad people, there are only bad leaders. Those who are responsible for the tragedy of Bosnia will have to answer for that, sooner or later, both in front of God and the people. Nobody will be able to avoid that responsibility. Bosnia will be the country of human rights, and fair trial and fair punishment is the human right of the culprit."


During the short period of, possibly, the most tumultuous time in the history of Bosnia, Izetbegovic was too often confronted with important decisions. Exposed to pressure from all sides - finding himself confronted with the different interests of the world, wishes and political intentions; squeezed even in the Party of Democratic Action by his own hawks; blackmailed by the partners in power, he still managed to show the degree of personal courage needed to declare publicly:" Bosnia is saved. What will it look like, that will be decided by its people today, and tomorrow, maybe, by its citizens". At that moment, there were few analysts, who managed to restrain themselves from announcing; "the Party, whose president is Izetbegovic, will get a new profile, and not make a mistake". The leader of the people and the party, who is continuously being blamed because one does not know whether he speaks as the president of the party, or as the chairman of the presidency, was announcing from official places a fight against war profiteers, revision of the expenditure of state finances, and some kind of purges within cadres. He was most impressive doing that during the great inspection; held on the 15th of April, 1997, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the B&H Army, at Kosevo stadium.

Instead of that, the Second Congress of the Party of Democratic Action followed. The Congress was held in a very much communist manner and scenery. In his paper Izetbegovic said, SDA created the army, preserved the state, fed the poor, and set the economy in motion. He even mentioned how many theatre performances were held from '92, till '96 (3.836). He even said: "At the meting (May 8-9,1993) the declaration of Tuzla was accepted, in which SDA resolutely refused any offer of ethnic partition of the territory." The Dayton Agreement was signed on November 21, 1995.

Vildana Selimbegovic
FAMA International - Sarajevo
DOSSIER, 1997

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